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Abstract
The distribution of firms’ growth and firms’ sizes is a topic under intense scrutiny. In this paper
we show that a thermodynamic model based on the Maximum Entropy Principle, with dynamical
prior information, can be constructed that adequately describes the dynamics and distribution of
firms’ growth. Our theoretical framework is tested against a comprehensive data-base of Spanish
firms, which covers to a very large extent Spain’s economic activity with a total of 1 155 142 firms
evolving along a full decade. We show that the empirical exponent of Pareto’s law, a rule often
observed in the rank distribution of large-size firms, is explained by the capacity of the economic
system for creating/destroying firms, and can be used to measure the health of a capitalist-based
economy. Indeed, our model predicts that when the exponent is larger that 1, creation of firms
is favored; when it is smaller that 1, destruction of firms is favored instead; and when it equals 1
(matching Zipf’s law), the system is in a full macroeconomic equilibrium, entailing “free” creation
and/or destruction of firms. For medium and smaller firm-sizes, the dynamical regime changes;
the whole distribution can no longer be fitted to a single simple analytic form and numerical
prediction is required. Our model constitutes the basis of a full predictive framework for the
economic evolution of an ensemble of firms that can be potentially used to develop simulations and
test hypothetical scenarios, as economic crisis or the response to specific policy measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many natural, social and economic phenomena follow power laws. It has been previously
ascertained that the distribution of incomes [1], size of cities [2–9], evolution of human
language [10], internet and genetic networks [11], and scientific publications and citations
[12, 13], all follow power laws. Finding a complete theory for describing these kind of systems
seem an impractical task, given the huge amount of degrees of freedom involved these social
systems. Notwithstanding, remarkable regularities were reported and studied, such as Zipf’s
law [14–17], or the celebrated Gibrat’s Law of proportional growth [18], which constitutes
important milestones on the quest for a unified framework that mathematically describe
predictable tendencies.
Firm size distributions (FSD) are the outcome of the complex interaction among several
economic forces. Entry of new firms, growth rates, business environment, government regu-
lations, etc., may shape different FSD. The underlying dynamics that drives the distribution
of firms’ sizes is still an issue under intense scrutiny. According to Gaffeo et al. [19], there
is an active debate going on among industrial organization’s scholars, in which log-normal,
Pareto, Weibull, or a mixture of them, compete for the best-fitting distributions of FSD.
One of the controversial issues is the very definition of “size”, which can be measured by
different proxies such as annual sales, number of employees, total assets, etc.
The seminal contribution by Gibrat [18] initiated a research line concerning the formal
model that governs firms’ sizes and industry structure. The introduction of a theoretical
model that would underlie the industrial demography could be of great help for authorities
interested in maintaining fair competence and/or antitrust policies.
Hart and Prais [20] find, using a database of large firms, that average growth rates
and sizes are independent variables. Quandt [21] states that Pareto’s distribution is often
rejected when analyzing industries sub-sectors. Other independent empirical studies, carried
out by Simon and Bonnini [22], Mansfield [23], and Bottazzi and Secchi [24], among others,
confirm that firms’ growth rates are not related to firm size and that FSD follow a log-
normal distribution. Jacquemin and Cardon de Lichtbuer [25] study the degree of firms
and industry concentration in British firms using Fortune’s 200 largest industrial companies
outside the United States, ranked according to sales. This study detects an increasing degree
of concentration.
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Kwasnicki [26] affirms that skewed size distributions could be found even in the absence
of economies of scale, and that the shape of the distribution is the outcome of innovation
in firms. In particular, according to his simulations, cost improving innovations generate
Pareto-like skewed distributions. This work also reconciles the finding by Ijiri and Simon
[27] about the concavity toward the origin of the log-log rank size plot. Such concavity could
be produced by the evolutionary forces and innovation in the market. Jovanic [28] finds that
rates of growth for smaller firms are larger and more variable than those of bigger firms.
Similar results are found empirically for Dutch companies by Marsili [29]. On contrary,
Vining [30] had argued that the origin of the concavity is the existence of decreasing returns
to scale.
Segal and Spivak [31] develop a theoretical model in which, under the presence of
bankruptcy costs, the rate of growth of small firms is prone to be higher and more variable
than that of larger firms. The same model also predicts that, for the largest firms, the
sequence of growth rates is convergent satisfying Gibrat’s law, namely
x˙i(t) = vi(t)xi(t), (1)
where xi(t) is the size of the ith firm at time t, x˙i(t) its change in time, and vi(t) a size-
independent growth rate. This model is consistent with some previous empirical evidence,
as that of Mansfield [23].
Sutton [32] has published a review of the literature on markets’ structure, highlighting
the current challenges concerning FSD modelling.
During the 1990s, the interest in FSD experienced a revamp, with the availability of
new data-bases. A drawback of early studies was a biased selection of firms. Typically,
data comprise only publicly traded firms, i.e., the largest ones. In recent years, new, more
comprehensive data sources became available.
Stanley et al. [33], use the Zipf-plot technique in order to verify fittings of selected data for
US manufacturing firms and find a non-lognormal right tail. Shortly afterwards, Stanley et
al. [34] encounter that the distribution of growth rates has an exponential form. Kattuman
[35] studies intra-enterprise business size distributions, finding also a skewed distribution.
Axtell [36], using Census data for all US firms, encounters that the FSD is right skewed,
giving support for the workings of Pareto’s law. A similar finding is due to Cabral and Mata
[37] for Portuguese manufacturing firms, although a log-normal distribution underestimates
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the skewness of the distribution and is not suitable for its lower tail. In this line, Fu et al.
[38] find that, for pharmaceutical firms in 21 countries, and for US publicly traded firms,
growth rates exhibit a central-portion distributed according to a Laplace distribution, with
power law tails. Palestrini [39] agrees with a power law distribution for firm sizes, although
he models firm growth as a Laplace distribution, that could change over business cycles.
According to Riccaboni et al. [40], the simultaneous study of firm sizes and growth
presents an intrinsic difficulty, arising from two facts: (i) the size distribution follows a
Pareto Law and (ii) firms’ growth rate is independent of the firm’s size. This latter property
is known as the “Law of Proportionate Effect”. Growiec et al. [41] study firms’ growth and
size distributions using firms’ business units as units of measurements. This study reveals
that the size of products follow a log-normal distribution, whereas firm-sizes decay as a
power law.
Gaffeo et al. [19], using data from 38 European countries, find that log mean and log
variance size are linearly related at sectoral levels, and that the strength of this relationship
varies among countries. Di Giovanni et al. [42] find that the exponent of the power law for
French exporting firms is lower than for non-exporting firms, raising the argument of the
influence of firm heterogeneity in the industrial demography. Additionally, Gallegati and
Palestrini [43] and Segarra and Teruel [44], show that sampling sizes influence the power-law
distribution.
One can fairly assert that the concomitant literature has not yet reached a consensus re-
garding what model could best fit empirical data. An overview of several alternative models
is detailed in Ref. [45], and references therein. As shown in the above literature review,
previous attempts to model growth and sizes of firms have not been entirely successful.
In particular, there is a dispute concerning the underlying stochastic process that steers
FSD. A possible solution in terms of agent-based model was proposed [46]; these models
are remarkable as descriptive tools, but they do not furnish an overall panorama because
are single-purpose models. Besides, they are sensitive to the initial conditions, and, in some
cases, their outcome depends on the length of the simulation time.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to develop a thermodynamic-like theoretical
model, able to capture typical features of firms’ distributions. We try to uncover the pu-
tative universal nature of FSD, which could be characterized by general laws, independent
of “microscopic” details. Secondly, to validate our theoretical model using an extensive
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database of Spanish manufacturing firms during a long time-period.
This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, it provides an expla-
nation for the stochastic distribution of firms’ sizes. The understanding of FSD is relevant
for economic policy because it deals with market concentration, and thus, with competi-
tion and antitrust policy measures —for example, Naldi [47] exhibits a relationship between
Zipf’s law and some concentration indices. Second, we apply our model to a large sample of
Spanish firms. Third, this work expands the literature on industrial economics modelling.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the theoretical framework and per-
form numerical experiments to validate our analytic approach. Then, we show the empirical
application to the Spanish firms. Finally, we draw some discussions and conclusions of our
work.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Our framework is based on two fundamental hypothesis:
1. a micro-economic dynamical hypothesis for individual firm growth; and
2. using the maximum entropy principle, with dynamical prior information, for describing
macroeconomic equilibrium.
A. Microdynamics
For the micro-economical hypothesis, we assume Gibrat’s law of proportional growth (Eq.
(1)) as the main mechanism underlying firms’ size evolution. A finite-size term, due to the
central limit theorem [6], becomes dominant for medium and small sizes, being proportional
to the square root of the size. In addition to these two terms, we also assume that non-
proportional forces become eventually effective, being dominant for the smallest sizes. Thus,
our full dynamical equation is written as
x˙i(t) = v1i(t)|xi(t)|+ v1/2i(t)|xi(t)|1/2 + v0i(t), (2)
where vqi(t) (q = 1, 1/2 and 0) are independent growth rates. It is expected that the growth
rates are of a stochastic nature. Thus, a temperature can be defined from their variance
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Tq = Var[vq]. Accordingly, assuming that the variation in the growth rates is much larger
than the variation in the observable x —as done in Refs. [5, 9] — the variance of the growth
for several realizations becomes
Var[x˙] = T1|x|2 + T1/2|x|+ T0. (3)
This equation defines three regimes, according to the size: small sizes x < T0/T1/2; medium
sizes T0/T1/2 < x < T1/2/T1; and large sizes T1/2/T1 < x. Because of the existence of the non-
proportional term, x is allowed to eventually take negative values. This defines an additional
set of temperatures for the negative domain, which in principle can be independent of those
at the positive one. Since all these temperatures can be measured from the raw data, their
properties can be empirically determined. In Fig. 1 we show a conceptual sketch of the
ensemble of firms evolving in time as random walkers along the different regimes, with the
corresponding temperature and dynamics for each of them.
B. MaxEnt Principle
For an ensemble of firms following Eq. (1), we assume that dynamical equilibrium is
asymptotically reached when some macroscopic constraints are obeyed. We cite the aver-
age total number of firms N , the typical wealthiness of a given particular region, or any
other objective observable. In view of the success of an entropic procedure for describing
equilibrium distributions in other social systems (as, e.g., city population distributions), we
take as our macroeconomic hypothesis the Principle of Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) with
dynamical prior information [5, 6, 48, 49], to predict the equilibrium density of the system.
We focus our analytic derivation on that particular regime that has received most attention
in the literature: the proportional growth-one: T1/2/T1 < x for the largest sizes. According
to Ref. [5], the entropy of a system following Gibrat’s law is measured in terms of the new
dynamical variable u(t) = log[x(t)/xc] (where xc is some reference value, in our case, the
transition size xc = T1/2/T1) which linearizes the dynamical equation as u˙i(t) = v1i(t). Thus,
we write the macroscopic entropy for the system’s density distribution ρ(u) for N firms as
S[ρ] = −
∫
duρ(u) log[ρ(u)/N ], (4)
The equilibrium density is obtained by extremization of S under the empirical constraints
[48, 49], such as the total number of firms, the minimum size of a firms, among others.
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Lacking them, as sometimes happens in physics, we will use a symmetry criterion [50]:
employ constraints that preserve a symmetry of scale of x(t), i.e. translation symmetry in
u(t). For this, we define an energy function, E [ρ], that depends on powers of the dynamical
variable u, namely
E [ρ] =
∑
n
λn
∫
duρ(u)(u− 〈u〉)n :=
∑
n
λnmn, (5)
where mn are the central moments of ρ and λn the coupling constants. The maximization
problem is written as δρ(S[ρ] − βE [ρ]) = 0, where β is a Lagrange multiplier (βλn become
then the multipliers for each term), and the general solution is of the form
ρ(u) = N exp
[
−1− β
∑
n
λn(u− 〈u〉)n
]
. (6)
The values of the multipliers are obtained by solving the system of Lagrange equations,
mn =
∫
duρ(u)(u− 〈u〉)n for the distribution of Eq. (6).
C. Connection with Thermodynamics
We consider, for simplicity, the linear regime with only the first two moments n = 0
(a constraint on the average total number of firms m0 = N) and n = 1 (a constraint on
the mean value 〈u〉 written as m1 = 0). Since the equations are formally equivalent to
those found in Thermodynamics, and traditionally the multipliers associated with these
constraints are [51, 52] β := 1/T1, λ0 := −µ, λ1 := λ, we have a thermodynamic potential
Ω = −T1S − µN + λU, (7)
where U = 〈u− 〈u〉〉. The variational problem becomes δρΩ[ρ] = 0. We obtain the distribu-
tion
ρ(u) = Ne−(λu−µ)/T1 . (8)
The distribution is cast in terms of the observable x as
ρX(x)dx = Ne
µ∗ x
λ∗
c
x1+λ∗
dx (9)
where µ∗ = µ/T1 and λ∗ = λ/T1. Accordingly, we obtain a power law density. Useful for
analyzing the empirical data is the complementary of the cumulative distribution F (x) =∫ x
xc
dx′ρ(x′), that reads
N − P (x) = N
(xc
x
)λ∗
. (10)
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The solutions of the Lagrange equations lead to
e−µ/T1 = 〈u〉; and λ = T1/〈u〉, (11)
and to the equation of state:
eµ
∗
= λ∗. (12)
This is the relevant equation for interpreting the empirical data, since λ∗ can be measured
from the data and µ∗ can be interpreted thanks to the thermodynamic analogy.
Indeed, comparing our results with those of a physical system, one can identify µ with
the chemical potential. We interpret µ as the “cost” for including/creating or exclud-
ing/extinguishing firms in the proportional large-size regime. Following MaxEnt [5, 6, 48],
the system is in contact with a reservoir of firms, and tends to minimize Ω. Since ∂Ω/∂N =
−µ, for µ > 0 any new firm, in the proportional regime, decreases Ω, making it more likely
the emergence of a flow of firms entering into the system. However, for µ < 0, any new firm
will increase the value of Ω, allowing for a flow of firms exiting the system. In the particular
case µ = 0 there is no cost for the flow of firms, in what we expect to be an equilibrium,
stable, and healthy situation for a capitalist economy.
The thermodynamic variable λ defines the exponent of the distribution, and can be
interpreted as a measure of the typical wealth of a region. Specifically, it determines the
scale of the size of firms, because it constraints the geometric mean of x. Indeed, the use of
the geometric mean instead of the mean is common for systems with scale invariance, where
long-tailed distributions have undefined moments but well-defined log-moments [53, 54].
This value will change from one economy to other one.
Thanks to the equation of state Eq. (12), we can provide an intuitive, physically-based
interpretation of that exponent:
• for λ < 1 (µ < 0) the system favors the extinction of firms;
• for λ > 1 (µ > 0) the system favors the creation of firms;
• for λ = 1 (µ = 0) the system freely creates and extinguishes firms.
This last particular case corresponds to the Zipf’s law distribution, namely
N − P (x) = N xc
x
. (13)
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III. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In aim of testing our theoretical procedure we have performed numerical experiments in
terms of random walkers via a Monte Carlo simulation (MC). At the initial time, the N
random walkers are randomly located using a uniform distribution. We assume independent
stochastic Wiener coefficients for different firms, within each of the three regimes or, more
explicitly,
〈vqi(t)vq′j(t′)〉 = Tqδijδqq′δ(t− t′), (14)
where q defines the specific dynamical regime, as in Eq. (2). In order to make explicit the
mechanisms that govern the dynamics, we will use a reduced approach, in which each of
the regimes, according to the size x, evolves independently. Therefore, instead of simulating
the whole dynamics, i.e. Eq. (2), we aim to understand the particular contribution of each
term in that equation. Henceforth, we will focus in the interplay between the linear and
proportional growth regimes, disregarding the intermediary regime. To achieve this goal, we
use the following equation for the microscopic dynamics:
x˙i(t) =
v0,i(t), for x < xc,v1,i(t)xi(t), for x > xc, (15)
where xc defines the border between the linear and the proportional regimes. Since the
number of walkers in the proportional regime is not constrained, we follow here the given
recipe for a Grand canonical ensemble [51, 52] where µ is fixed and the fluctuation in the
number of walkers is determined by the probabilities of including (P+) or extracting (P−) a
walker as
P+ ∝ eµ∗ and P− ∝ e−µ∗ . (16)
According to these probabilities, in an ensemble with µ∗ = 0 any walker can leave or enter
into the system without any restriction. Additionally, following Eq. (11) the constraint
〈u〉 = 〈ln(x/xc)〉 = 1 should be fulfilled. We have performed several realizations with
different initial conditions, and let the system evolve until reaching equilibrium. In Fig.
2, we show the rank plot, Eq. (10), for different simulation times, measured in MC steps.
Here we choose xc = 100. We see that the equilibrium distribution (for ∼ 3000 MC cycles)
follows the Zipf’s law. Moreover, we show in Fig. 2 the chemical potential for the equilibrium
distribution. We see that, up to some fluctuations, the constraint µ∗ = 0 is respected.
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We find that the equilibrium distribution does not depend on the initial conditions, and
follows Zipf’s law: for large values, the complementary of the cumulative distribution follows
Eq. (13), as predicted by our thermodynamic framework. The distribution deviates from
the analytic result, Eq. (13), as the size of x reaches the transition critical valued xc. In
view of these results, we numerically validate our analytic procedure.
IV. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
In order to empirically verify our theoretical model, we consider the Spanish SABI
database [55, 56], which is a comprehensive one for all firms that have the obligation to
disclose balance sheets in the Spanish Mercantile Register. Our sample consists of 1 155 142
firms along a decade, with more than 500 000 firms per year. We select those firms which
have been active at any time during the last 10 years and use as our observable xi(t) for the
ith firm at year t the so-called Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amorti-
zation (EBITDA). This quantity is widely employed for assessing companies’ performances.
It is homogeneous across companies and is not affected by different forms of financing. We
believe that our proxy for size is a clear indicator of both corporate performance and size.
A. Microdynamics
We first test our microscopic dynamical hypothesis by measuring the variance of the
EBITDA growth for each year. Since the EBITDA values can be negative, we study sep-
arately positive and negative domains. We first analyze all the Spanish firms in the same
set, displaying in Fig. 3 the dependence of the growth-variance on the EBITDA for the year
2009. We find a remarkable match to Eq. (2) for both positive and negative domains. The
transition to proportional growth takes place, in this case, at x = T1/2/T1 = 109× 103 euro.
Additionally, in both domains, the linear regime temperature, T0, is of the same order of
magnitude. As shown in the Supporting Information, all the available data for 10 years
match Eq. (2), with slightly changing temperatures. A similar analysis, made per each
Spanish autonomous community, shows that the dynamics is also obeyed individually by
regions, as shown in Fig. 4. We do not find any exception for all the 15 Spanish autonomous
communities during these 10 years. In view of these results, we empirically confirm the va-
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lidity of the dynamical equation (2). Additionally, we find that the temperatures T1 and T1/2
for the negative domain are significantly higher than those for the positive one. Remark-
able, as shown in Fig. 5, T0 can be considered the same for positive and negative EBITDA,
indicating that the same non-proportional regime is connecting both domains.
B. Macroequilibrium
Once the dynamical equation has been validated, we pass to the rank-distributions. We
plot in Fig. 6 the complementary cumulative function N−P (x) for all Spanish firms in 2009,
including those with positive and negative EBITDA. We observe that for large values of this
function the power law Eq. (13) is followed, as predicted by our thermodynamic equilibrium
hypothesis, with an exponent very close to that of Zipf’s law λ = 1. For smaller values, the
distribution deviates from the power law. We have checked that this deviation takes place
at about the same transition value xc = T1/2/T1, as predicted by our numerical experiments.
This is a compelling evidence for the relation between the dynamics and the distribution
given by our theoretical framework. We also measure the chemical potential µ∗, via the
equation of state Eq. (12). This chemical potential is, in general, with some deviations,
close to µ = 0, value for which the creation/extinction of firms has no cost for the energy
potential function E . We find the same picture when studying the firms’ distribution per
each community. In general, all distributions are very close to the Zipf’s regime. In view of
these results, we consider that our theoretical framework properly describes the dynamics
and equilibrium of the ensemble of Spanish firms.
V. DISCUSSION
Some interesting assertions can be made with regards to our theoretical framework. The
most relevant, the thermodynamic interpretation of the exponent λ∗ of the long-tail in size
distribution. Thanks to the equation of state Eq. (12) we provide for the first time a clear
explanation of this exponent, linking that adimensional number with a dynamical, intuitive
mechanism as the cost to the system of creating or extinguish a firm, measured by the
chemical potential µ∗. This interpretation can be used to measure the macroscopic effect of
particular economical policies, and to measure how healthy is a capitalist-based economy.
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We find that, in general, the value of µ∗ in Spanish regions is close to zero —as shown in
Fig. 6— indicating the freedom of creating or extinguishing a firm.
Additionally, we settle here the form of the microscopic dynamics by Eq. (2), and its
dependence with the size. Contrarily to other social systems following proportional growth
[5, 9, 57], here exists the possibility of negative values. This requires an additional dynamical
mechanism for the evolution of firms, that is successfully included in our current approach
as a linear term dominant for small sizes. Firms can be classified according to the dynamical
regime, even if they are in the negative (losses) or positive (gain) domain. In a pictorial way,
we can talk about heaven (positive proportional regime), hell (negative proportional regime),
or purgatory (linear regime). The fact that the temperatures in the positive domain are
systematically smaller than in the negative one, as illustrated in Fig. 5, can be summarized
as hell is warmer than heaven. Thus, a firm in hell losses money in a faster fashion than it
would equivalently earn it in heaven.
We also find useful as macroeconomic indicator the position of the transition zone between
medium and proportional growth regime in the negative domain, that gives an estimate of
the minimum losses a firm can afford before going bankrupt —or metaphorically, the hell’s
gate. Similarly, the same transition but in the positive domain provides an estimation of the
success region for firms —that we might wish to call heaven’s door. Fig. 7 shows both tran-
sition values from 2003 to 2012 as measured by the respective temperature ratios T1/2/T1.
We observe that, before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, both transitions were approxi-
mately equivalent in size, exhibiting a symmetry between positive and negative regimes.
Right before this crisis, the negative value reached its maximum, indicating some abnormal
economic growth, potentially related with the speculative bubble. The confidence interval
for this specific year is higher than the absolute value, indicating that this phenomenon did
not happen with the same intensity among all the autonomous communities. Finally, in the
succeeding years, the negative value was reduced to a half, augmenting the probability of
firms to go bankrupt; whereas the positive transition also decreased, although not as rapidly
as in the negative domain. After the burst of the crisis, both transitions tend to converge
again to a similar value, but lower than before the crisis. Because the equation of state Eq.
(12) and the constrained value of 〈u〉, this lower value reflects a general reduction of the
wealth in the whole system, because it diminishes, on average, the scale of the successful
firms at the proportional regime.
13
As a final remark, the numerical simulation provided here based on walkers under the
Grand canonical ensemble opens the possibility of developing simulation tools where eco-
nomical forces can be introduced in the same fashion as done for physical forces for gases
and liquids. Indeed, we open a bridge between the mathematical tools used in statistical me-
chanics and firms’ dynamics. Our analytic and numerical procedures can be used to deeply
analyze the empirical data measuring and parameterizing the economic forces in play, and
develop a full quantitative theory about these dynamics. Work in this line is in progress.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We advanced in this paper a complete thermodynamic framework which accommodates
the firm size distribution of a given region. We propose an empirically proof a microscopic
dynamical hypothesis, and show how the firms obey the maximum entropy principle at the
macroscopic level. We analytically proof the connection between microscopic dynamics and
equilibrium firm’s size-distributions via MaxEnt, and formulate the equation of state that
relates the exponent of the long tail in size distributions with a well-known thermodynamic
observable as the chemical potential. This lead to a clear and intuitive interpretation of the
exponents, showing that can be used to measure the health of a economy. Indeed, the emer-
gence of Zipf’s law is associated with the free cost to the system of creating and extincting
firms, as expected in a capitalist-based economy. All these theoretical considerations have
been validated by comparison with empirical data concerning Spanish firms, in a window of
a decade. We expect this work to be a first step towards the formalization of a theory of
the evolution of firms that will yield underlying forces and laws of evolution.
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FIG. 1. Conceptual sketch of firms’ dynamics according with Eq. (2) and (3). Firms (repre-
sented here by dots) evolve as random walkers in time —similar to particles in a gas— according
to the regime defined by they earnings (delimited by dashed horizontal lines) and the empirical
temperature at that regime. Brown solid arrows show the path for two of the firms.
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FIG. 2. Rank plot (left) and chemical potential (right) for the simplified dynamics of Eq. (15). We
use N = 104 random walkers with transition to proportional growth at xc = 100 (dashed vertical
line). The equilibrium distribution is reached after ∼ 3000 MC cycles.
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FIG. 3. Variance of EBITDA for the set of all Spanish firms in 2009. The colored lines correspond
to the fit according to Eq. (2). The black solid line sketchs the trend-regime: linear for small
firm-sizes, FSC for medium, and proportional growth for the largest sizes.
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FIG. 4. Variance of EBITDA for some Spanish autonomous communities in 2009. The colored-
surfaces correspond to the fit according to Eq. (2).
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FIG. 5. Temperatures T1, T1/2, and T0 as function of the year. Faded lines represent the temper-
ature evolution for every autonomous community, bold blue and red lines represent the Spanish
mean temperature.
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FIG. 6. Rank plot (left) and chemical potential (right) for the empirical data of Spain in 2009.
The observed temperatures for positive EBITDA are T1 = 1.27 ± 0.15, T1/2 = 140 ± 20, and
T0 = 1100± 200, and for negative EBITDA T1 = 6.1± 0.9, T1/2 = 250± 50, and T0 = 1500± 500.
The vertical dashed lines display the transition to proportional growth regimes, where the equation
of state (12) holds.
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FIG. 7. Spain’s annual transition to the proportional regime. This is measured by the rate
xc = T1/2/T1.
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